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The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked the start of the largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II, bringing significant changes to the battlefield. Unlike pre vious conflicts involving cyber warfare, where one side typically main tained complete dominance, the war in Ukraine features two states with demonstrated capabilities in this domain. The cyber conflict, however, actually began in 2014 during the Donbas crisis, when Russia carried out a series of destructive operations that exposed the vulnerabilities of Ukraine’s digital infrastructure. These attacks laid the groundwork for reforming and strengthening Ukraine’s cyber defenses, which, with support from Western allies, enabled the country to withstand the in itial wave of Russian cyberattacks in 2022. Following the initial cyber offensive, which accompanied the ground invasion but fell short of ex pectations, the conflict entered a phase in which both sides carried out attacks of considerably lower sophistication than those at the outset. This paper analyses the development and dynamics of cyber operations within the broader context of the conventional conflict, including the key actors, objectives, employed techniques, and the outcomes achieved in cyberspace. Special attention is given to the question of why Rus sian cyber operations failed to achieve more significant strategic effects, despite Moscow’s resources. The author concludes that these limited results can be attributed to Ukraine’s timely and well-structured prepar edness, effective international cooperation, and the inherent nature of cyber warfare, which, under conditions of organized defence tends to favour the defender over the attacker. The war in Ukraine thus shows that the cyber domain, while not decisive on its own, plays a significant complementary role alongside the physical battlefield, particularly in the areas of communication, intelligence, and psychological operations.