

CONTEMPORARY MIGRATIONS - WALLS AS A SOURCE OF (IN)SECURITY*

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At the beginning, this paper firstly analyses the duality of borders, as a place of contact and a place of misunderstandings, tensions, and quite often, of open conflicts, and this is done from two points of view: social and security. The first one refers to social foundations of a border, widely accepted as mutual recognition of one's self and others, while the second dimension brings to the forefront the strong analogy between borders and walls. As the first aspect most often relates to wider social engagement, the second is closely tied to security element of border management, or the securing of the phenomenon and reacting to it using a range of repressive "tools". It is the second dimension of the observation of the problem that leads us to the world of contemporary walls in front of (and around) which different relations occur with pronounced (in)security. The focal issue of this paper is the extent to which the current walls are the factor of safety, and to what extent they generate instability. On the basis of the conducted research procedure, this paper concludes that walls reinforce the sovereignty claim of a state, but they cannot be an efficient security measure for the inhabitants of border areas and members of migrant population.

Key words: *Migrations, security, borders, walls, conflicts.*

*„Borders exist in the minds of some people.”
Thor Heyerdahl*

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Introduction

Migrations existed throughout the history of mankind. People left their homes for many different reasons, such as hunger, wars and persecution, and because of everlasting human obsession with “promised lands”, as “safe harbours” where they would secure a life worthy of man for themselves and their offspring. Consequently, there is not one but several migration theories, diffused across several academic disciplines. There is a tendency among economists to focus on mechanisms that are seemingly universal, but most often separated from historical or regional context. Microeconomic theory of migration points out that the decision to migrate simply depends on the comparison of wages in the country and abroad and possible expenditures related to migration. Concurrently, historians point to characteristics of every migration wave, and they are sceptical about universal explanations, while geographers and sociologists underline the significance of established migration channels and migration networks for the formation of flows. Political scientists and legal advisers assert the supremacy of immigration policy and law, not limiting themselves to necessary living and work conditions in a certain country, but to the rights and obligations of immigrants in different countries, while the cohesive interpretation of geography and politics is grounded on “the fact that geographic factors are permanently important for international relations” (Ajzehnamer, 2018: 282). In parallel with the strengthening of migrant pressure towards Europe, over the last twenty years or so, security sciences have joined this complex interdisciplinary mission to research this phenomenon.

It is interesting that, despite the lack of a unifying theoretic framework, empirical models often use variables from different theoretic frameworks that proved to be significant in the past. When explaining the migration phenomenon in the context of today’s borders and ever more present fences and walls that accompany them, this paper uses researches predominantly from the domain of political science and security science, and significant indicators from the sphere of sociology, psychology, economy and law as well.

Dualism of Borders: Between contact and conflict

Insecurity of people and human communities, as a timeless category and historical constant, is caused to the greatest part by temporariness. Temporariness has become a characteristic of jobs that we perform, places where we live in, people with whom we surround ourselves, and more and more often, the states in which we live. The mobility of people, as a consequence of ever more present temporariness, apart from being ever greater and massive, is marked by ever more pronounced unpredictability, since it does not have a unique and predictable direction. Unpredictability of human movement is superbly described by the lines of the most famous Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish, where he underlines that “Wind is the compass of the stranger’s North” (Darwish, 2023). Hence, one of those most important questions that is raised in the ever more mobile age is “In which direction will the wind turn?”. Searching for the answer to that question, we enter labyrinths where we lose the sense of direction

before we learn to move through them so we cannot get out of them (Subotić, 2022: 166).

Just like migrations, borders do not have one-dimensional meaning - they can be a place, geography, and psychology, some situation or a moment of encountering or establishing a relation with something else and different. In psychological sense, "a border can be understood as an experience of emotional and physical space between ourselves and other person, or as a group of imaginary lines that designate the place where we end, and others begin - where our emotional needs, beliefs, values stop and somebody else's begin" (Marisco, 2015: 329). Thus, the border implies psychological experience of space that points out that we and others are not the same, but it also implies the experience of space in which we unavoidably meet the others.

Basically, we differentiate between two dimensions of border issue. The first one refers to *social foundations of a border*, widely accepted as mutual recognition of one's self and others, while the second dimension represents *security approach to the problem*, which brings to the forefront the strong analogy between borders and walls. While the analysts inclined to more liberal sensibility when observing this problem often point out and support the reasons why borders should be relaxed, those more conservative ones advocate for the positive side of "rigid" borders speaking about them rather favourably. In one, seemingly paradoxical way, such different approach to borders exposes the "nature of globalisation that unstoppably spills over all borders, while new walls are being speedily erected aimed at stopping that torrent" (Dell'Agnese; Szary, 2015: 7).

For a very long time, we have considered borders as places where identities meet. But in contemporary and "selectively globalised" world, such position can be rightfully deemed anachronistic, predominantly because of the fact that globalisation (no matter if economic, political or cultural) has brought two seemingly opposed views of borders. The first view observes borders in the framework of widely understood translocality, while the second observes it in the context of multiplication of walls, i.e. it puts to the forefront their hermeticity and violence. As regards the point of view that underlines the translocality, a border is *de facto* vanishing, while the outcome of the concept that points out their impermeability is the situation in which borders are replaced by rigid walls (Agier, 2019: 68).

Most often this is spoken about as "closure of borders" which implies ever stricter jurisdiction, more brutal police methods (accompanied by xenophobic propaganda) that not a small number of European countries and the USA resort to. In fact, this is the matter of a widely spread reaction to ever more intensive movement of people at the planetary level, accompanied by the impression that people cross borders "way too easily". The consequence of such perception of reality, in the second decade of 20th century was the profiling of two forms of reactions to the "new migrations of peoples": *erecting walls* and *extension of borders* (Agier, 2019: 69). In a one-of-a-kind competition using walls against migrants, in general terms against "the other" and different, we notice exactly what determines a border. Likewise, we notice what delegitimises and denies it. When it comes to border extension, there is a more sophisticated perfidy at work: it is evident that they are extended, both in spatial and time and social sense, so the stay on them is ever longer, with greater insecurity with more pronounced lack of

social rules and norms. Thus, the insecurity tends to become a context, if not the rule of living "on" the border.

Concurrently with, as often highlighted during the '90s, "the end of the conflict between the East and West", and the opening of markets and territories, a general feeling spread that we can live in a relaxed world whose last impassable border would be the natural border of the planet Earth. On the basis of such "conclusions", simplified, utopian and overly optimistic notions of the world and its future emerged. Indeed, if we focus on recent past (the period between the '60s and '90s of XX century, i.e. from the momentum of decolonisation to the fall of the Berlin Wall), we speak about a period marked by sudden development of communications and means of mass communication, which resulted in significantly greater mobility of people. Often mentioned Kantian stance on "cosmopolitan right as natural right to visit and mobility of people" (Kant, 1995: 50) seemed to be achievable. Today, these positions are much rarer in political life of sovereign states and other international collectivities, where it is considered that such projections are exclusively the matter of humanist ideals, and as such, unrealistic and unusable in the "politics grounded on facts".

What has caused lesser flexibility of borders between states? It is obvious that the swift end of colonialism in the early '60s, and even more dramatic collapse of communism in the late '80s, pushed a large number of states into a paradoxical global political order. This order simultaneously demanded borders to be both strong - "borders are not frozen, but states are practically forbidden to change them by force", and weak - they should not "separate people" but "hold them together" (Zacher, 2001: 246). The result of the combination of such expectation (of the great ones) and (un)suitable response to that (by the small ones) was the fact that "today, there are much more states, predominantly extremely weak ones, whose borders are stable by definition" (Hironaka, 2005: 2).

What is this new global reality essentially like? Obviously, globalisation has not abolished borders but it has transformed, shifted, separated them one from the other, and most often made discriminatory selection in terms of what is classified as globally good, and what (who) should be enclosed by walls. Thus, the globalisation can be observed as its own opposite or, as professor Stojanović notices: "Instead of global rapprochement, which was the leading idea of global processes, the modern world faces the process of intensive global separation" (Stojanović, 2016: 28).

Globalisation, understood primarily (or exclusively) in economic terms, has taken the form of "partial denationalisation of economy" (Sassen, 2003: 7). Observed exclusively as an economic category, it represents a framework in which only capital is supremely global, chiefly owing to the fact that it is not interested in border, national identities or minorities. Limited and partial inclusion of national economies in the overall process of global economy and finances mostly occurs only in populist narratives that political actors address to voters during election campaigns, while later, this is usually forgotten because this is the segment of policy that is difficult to realise.

In this way, in the sphere of policy, there is a pathetic aspiration towards national affirmation, while in the "no border" sphere, or the sphere of economy and relentless market, the work is essentially done on denationalisation in the field of work, trade exchange and communication. In this feigned conflict, populists usually benefit, not

in the part that relates to the mobility of goods and services, but in the part that refers to the mobility of people. Hence, they (over)stress the intensified mobility of people as “another bad consequence of globalisation”, and often demand that this segment of mobility should be limited and controlled more drastically (Brown, 2015). Thus “the right-wing populism in narratives of anti-immigration policy, has become part of election slogans of political parties some of which have become part of executive power” (Subotić; Mitrović, 2023: 117).

It is evident that the mobile world of the present can be understood only if we concurrently take into consideration the ties between people who are “cruising” the planet today and the narrative that ties people to territory, stressing their indigeness. This second narrative comes to the forefront when analysis of today’s migrations is in question, and it is materialised through erection of walls and glorification of “others” as the source of “our” problems, even as a danger or threat from which we save ourselves by ousting those who have entered, and erecting walls and fences towards those who are about to come to “us” (McGowan, 2022).

Borders and (in)security - Return of the walls

Border walls and fortifications date from classical times and middle age. Certainly, the most famous are those of Roman and Chinese empires, and yet, for decades there was an attempt to reach consensus on making rigid border barriers the thing of the past. In the framework of newer notions of human communication and transport, and even warfare, walls are perceived as “outdated physical structures that were used in the past for the protection of border integrity” (Treb, et al. 2018). Do walls contribute to the felling of insecurity as much as they mitigate fears and create the feeling of safety for those “behind the line”, and how exactly is security linked to border walls?

The nineties of the previous century were regarded as the epoch of optimism. The end of conflict between superpowers, adhering to the principle of Washington consensus (Douglas; Ward, 2021) and new digital communication have brought about the idea of the “global village” where information, people and capital would flow freely (Zenderowski; Jankowski, 2018). The creation of European market, North American Free Trade Agreement, and established African regional integration seemed to have reconfirmed the trend of borders becoming ever more irrelevant. Globalisation accelerated as never before. Border walls appeared obsolete, if not irrelevant in this new world.

However, that radically changed at the turn of the millennium. At the beginning, modern walls were erected in response to terrorist threats after Al-Qaeda attack on the World Trade Centre in New York, but later, especially after the break out of great recession in 2008, the construction of border walls fitted into the global pattern of deglobalisation, populism and, related anti-immigration policy (Gülzau; Mau, 2021).

The growth of populism has increased the number of walls built globally, since nations suffer with “identity crisis” being faced with globalisation (CBS Radio, 2019). It is important to note that many walls were constructed after 1990 and they were erected on borders which were not disputed. They are described as “globalisation walls constructed by both autocracies and democracies in crumbling and healthy states alike” (Zenderowski; Jankowski, 2018).




Figure 1. Increase in the number of walls at global level, 1945-2015 (Vallet, 2020)

The representation illustrates that more than a half of existing walls were constructed after 2008, or since the beginning of the great recession which coincides with the beginning of the present deglobalisation phase, and the first indication of the increase in the construction of new walls is the year of the terrorist attack against New York, concurrently with the “spectacular media coverage of that event” (Subotić, 2023: 68). That is why some of these walls are often mentioned in media such as those between Israel and Palestine, between the United States and Mexico or between Nordic European countries and Russia. Some of them are less known like the wall Melilla between Spain and Morocco or the electric fence between Botswana and Zimbabwe. Also, it should be noted that the construction of ten new walls is currently being planned (Kamwela, et al. 2023). Indeed, the return of the phenomenon of border walls was unexpected - both as the problem of practical policy and as a scientific challenge in circumstances where “almost one third of the countries have erected some kind of walls or fences as part of their borders” (Szabó, 2018: 87). The importance of border

walls is somewhat underestimated by this reference number, since, by definition, they are never constructed by clearly rounded island states, which make around one quarter of world trading states and entities. Hence, border walls and fences are used by approximately one half of the countries that can “sensibly” erect them.

More movement - more walls

The history of walls certainly “goes beyond the story about brick and stone” (Frye, 2019, 21), and it is a multilayer story about everlasting competition of those who have defended themselves and those who attacked them. That is why, in the past, the walls were primarily observed as defensive barriers of limited size most often built around densely populated towns. Although there are several historical examples of long walls, the most famous among them being the Hadrian’s Wall, they served the similar purpose - they marked the defensive area and provided infrastructure for easier repelling of attacks.

In the meantime, the purpose of the walls has changed. Unlike the past, today’s countries control territories with fixed borders that most governments of the world have agreed to respect, which is why the use of the walls to mark territorial control is outdated. While Mongolians and Chinese did not recognise each other’s legitimate power over the territory, today, the majority of countries are members of the United Nations and, in keeping with the UN Charter, they agree to honour the borders and territorial sovereignty of all other member states. Until the middle of 20th century, most countries stabilised their borders not expecting territorial invasion by neighbouring militaries. For example, the United States is not worried whether Mexico or Canada would invade it in order to change the borders to their benefit. Instead, the borders have become “invisible lines” marked by different economic, political and cultural systems, embodied in a national state. Over the last 30 years, during the so-called globalisation era, the purpose of borders shifted to the prevention of unauthorised movement of people.

In the second half of 20th century, global population grew fast, from 3 billion in 1960, to more than 7 billion today (Lam, 2023). At the same time, great economic differences appeared between the richest and the poorest places of the world, which compelled many people to move from rural areas to towns, and, finally, to cross borders in search of better living opportunities. In the meantime, numerous wars, such as those in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, and later in Syria, caused millions of people to leave the borders of their countries searching for security. In ten years alone, the number of people that have been forcefully displaced grew by 71 percent - reaching 65 million in 2015 in comparison to estimated 38 million in 2005 (UNHCR, 2017).

In light of the concern over the great number of asylum seekers and effects that their arrival could exert on public budgets, employment and social cohesion, border walls suddenly became attractive to leaders in key destinations or transit countries. For some, the barriers represent a tangible solution to suppress unauthorised entrance. This position can be summed up by often repeated Tramp’s mantra on the importance of borders: “We, as a country, either have borders or we don’t. If we don’t have bor-

ders, we don't have a country!" (Twitter, 2015). Thus, the border walls have become the central issue in American presidential race, with Trump's promise that he would build a "magnificent wall" along remaining 1300 unfenced miles of the border between the USA and Mexico (Jones, 2016).

Apart from that, the fear of terrorism played a considerable role in the removal of stigma that used to be attached to the construction of border walls. Along with additional checks at airports, enlarged police presence at public events, increased surveillance of telephone and internet communications, border walls have become a part of the package of security measures that a state could reasonably undertake to protect its citizens against terrorism.

Effectiveness of the walls: What do facts say?

It is evident that in 21st century, the construction of border fortifications is a new occurrence at global level. The less clear is if such walls are efficient, and the answer depends on their intended purpose. The walls are not efficient in repelling modern armed forces, since aircraft and projectiles fly over them, and tanks can breach them. Furthermore, today, a border barrier is not needed to mark territorial perimeter of a country.

But, what of the use of walls as a means of stopping irregular migrants? Though that has been promoted as an adequate and popular solution, opinions are divided regarding their efficiency in the prevention of mass movement of people over borders. Of course, there is no doubt that shorter walls well-guarded by soldiers or police officers can be highly efficient in stopping the movement. That was shown in the nineties on the border between the USA and Mexico, when first segments of the fence were constructed in El Paso near San Diego, with the support of great engagement of border patrol agents. In weeks that followed, crossings in those sectors were almost stopped. Likewise, the construction of Hungarian border fence in 2015, was supported by border guards resulting in significantly less border crossings.

However, in both cases the reinforced walls did not fully prevent border crossings, but they rather redirected them to other locations that were more remote or less fortified. In the case of the USA, since urban routes with large circulation were closed, migrants and smugglers started using outlying and dangerous deserts of western Arizona. In European migrant crisis in 2016, after land routes through the Balkans had been closed, migrants adapted by shifting their routes using boats across the Mediterranean Sea, most often from Libya.

Redirection of migrants to alternative routes points to other statistics closely linked to the increase in wall construction, and that is the increase in the number of deaths among migrant population. Namely, since easier paths have been closed, migrants opt for more dangerous routes to reach their destinations. At US-Mexican border, that was evident in the drop of cases of death in California with simultaneous increase in Arizona (Montoya-Galvez, 2024). Similarly, when the European Union and its member states fortified their borders in 2015, a record 3,770 cases of death were reported at the rim of the European Union (IOM, 2016). In 2016, when easier land route through the Balkans and Eastern Europe was closed, the rate of deaths additionally grew. No

less than 5,085 migrants lost their lives in the Mediterranean in 2016, which represented 34 percent increase when compared to 2015 (IOM, 2017).

The walls unavoidably lead to the increase in the “demand” for smugglers’ services, Serbia being one of blatant examples (as a country on, formally closed, but never interrupted, Balkan route which represents the last stop before the “gates” of the European Union and Schengen zone). Along entire border with Hungary illegal settlements emerge as one of a kind migrant collectors with potential for new iteration of smugglers’ services, which is accompanied by conflicts between smugglers’ groups and overall growth in insecurity in border areas (Subotić, 2024).

Despite these clear material influences on migrants’ lives, and evident expansion of criminal smuggling activities in the vicinity of erected border fences, millions of people worldwide continue crossing borders without permit - which means that the walls are relatively inefficient. The first reason is that longer borders are extremely difficult to fence along their entire length and protect adequately. The construction of a fence or a wall, also implies acquiring necessary land, construction and maintenance of roads and supply of required work force for the protection of the barrier. The second reason why the walls are inefficient is that many unauthorised movements, especially movements of terrorists or smugglers do not occur between border crossing points. A significant number of illegal migrants entered the United States with valid visas never to leave the country, violating the terms of their visas. Apart from that, a lot of smuggled goods come through ports of entry or tunnels constructed under the walls. Since the beginning of the nineties, the United States have discovered 150 tunnels under the border between the USA and Mexico, some of them being rather sophisticated (Jones, 2016), while Israel plans to construct an underground wall on the border between Egypt and Gaza in order to solve the problem of dozens of tunnels that it has discovered (Khalil, 2023).

The efficiency of walls as the obstacle against “growing terrorism” is also questionable. Research led by Sergi Pardos-Prado, the leading researcher at the University in Glasgow, shows that the construction of border barriers can increase the probability of new conflicts, and even terrorist attacks. In case studies of Saudi-Iraqi and Israeli-Egyptian walls, researchers analysed how the attitude of people towards the other country significantly deteriorated after the construction of the wall. “Erecting wall signals and intensifies a conflict, even without conflict circumstances that were latent before the construction of the wall” (Pardos-Prado, 2020: 191).

New walls, apart from ethical and security connotations also have the economic one. Therefore, a question is raised as to their economic justification, more precisely from the perspective of the cost of their construction, maintenance and possible removal, and the damage in terms of economic exchange between the countries divided by such barriers. Vernon and Zimmermann dealt with economic (un)justification of walls on the example of the analysis of the rigid border between the USA and Mexico, where they raised quite logical question: “Is the wall worth it if it prevents 40,000 people from working in the USA - when expenses of its realisation include 3 billion dollars for the construction of the wall, many more billions for its maintenance, hundreds of people who die crossing the border, and potential economic benefits from Mexican work force that citizens of the USA do not get because workers-migrants do not come” (Vernon; Zimmermann, 2019).

Financial misuses that accompany the construction of new fences, and their corruption potential are also the subject of researchers' attention. The greatest flourishing of dealings at border fences in Europe took place after Viktor Orbán had passed the decision to fence the border between Hungary and Serbia in 2015. Estimates suggest that Hungary spent more than two billion euros for the construction of that wall. One of the companies that benefited the most was „metALCOM Zrt”, whose chief shareholder is Zoltán Bozó, a businessman and member of Orbán's party Fides (Bautista, 2024).

The Orbán's decision created a “domino effect”, so other European countries quickly followed this example. In 2006, for the installation of “razor wire” on border walls of Ceuta and Melilla, Spain hired the services of the company “Mora Salazar”, which had been up to that moment a small family firm for the sale of fences for houses and small enterprises. Today, the firm goes by its new name “European Security Fencing” - a multinational company with offices in Brussels and Berlin, with business activity in more than 30 border zones worldwide (Bautista, 2024). Removal of border fences between Slovenia and Croatia led to a huge controversy. Slovenia granted 7 million euros for the removal of the fence to the company “Minis” - the same firm that had installed that fence in 2015 (STA, 2023).

Conclusion

Phenomenon of borders and walls, that are becoming ever more frequent on the stage of geopolitical and overall security relevance, returned in the nineties of XX century, which is paradoxical to a certain extent having in mind the growing globalisation which was, at least declaratively, based on more free movement of people, goods, services and capital. Indeed, borders have ceased to exist in case of capital and most diverse goods, while new borders, in the form of fences and fortifications, are intended primarily for man. Therefore, the period of establishment of “more fluid and relaxed world” is accompanied by security of human movement to the level achieved in the middle of previous decade which was maintained until the present.

This paper firstly analyses the dual nature of a border as such, as a place of contact and a place of conflicts, and this is done from two dimensions of the border issue: social and security dimension. The first one refers to social foundations of a border, widely accepted as mutual recognition of one's self and others, while the second dimension brings to the forefront the strong analogy between borders and walls. As the first aspect relates to wider social engagement, the second is closely tied to security element of border management– the securing of the phenomenon. It is the second dimension of the observation of the problem that leads us to the world of contemporary walls in front of (and around) which different relations occur with pronounced (in)security.

If walls did not function in the past, and today they are built only to redirect, not to prevent migrant flows, with serious economic expenditures that accompany them, why has their number increased so drastically over the previous 30 years? They are obviously effective as symbols that show to the world, characterised by declarative return of state sovereignties, that populists are undertaking something to respond to observed threats that illegal movements entail. Threats perceived in such a way could be economic, as

a fear from newly arrived workers who “take income and jobs from the citizens”. They can be in the sphere of the protection of local culture, in the sense that migrants bring different traditions, languages and ways of life that mostly do not match the local culture.

Though the problems that mass migrations entail are complex and they, to a great extent, are not solved by fortified or unfortified borders, “Build walls!” is an effective slogan, and the barrier itself is a powerful visual symbol of care for national security and interests. Even though it can be stated in narrower security, and especially ever more present populist discourse, that walls reinforce the claim of a state about its sovereignty, it can also be unequivocally concluded that such type of physical barrier cannot stop migrations, but it only redirects migrant flows increasing the potential for criminal activities of organised smuggling groups. In addition, the walls are not an efficient security measure both for the inhabitants of border areas and members of migrant population.

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Summary

The fall of the Berlin Wall is often mentioned as the symbol of open Europe - the Europe without walls. At that, everyone forgets that the hostility towards the newcomers existed even then, but it was mostly directed towards the people who came from the countries of central and eastern Europe (some of them praising the walls the most loudly now). The optimism of the nineties, grounded on the global world with relaxed borders, turned out to be one of the greater delusions in the modern history. The world that emerged after the Cold War, today became the world of fortified walls, not of open borders.

A great number of modern countries are erecting walls on their borders fearing that, without such defence, far more affected and poor people would seek salvation in them. Conservative political parties use this argument more and more often in their political programmes and election campaigns. On the other hand, more liberal politicians also underline the good sides of migrations in Europe where “average citizen of the EU is 42.4 years old” (Đorić, 2017: 45), with ever more pronounced problems with work force, and they believe that the Old Continent is capable of absorbing uninvited newcomers.

Walls already divide Europe ideologically. The European Commission and countries like Spain and Germany oppose the use of EU money for the construction of more walls, believing that there are more efficient “tools” to suppress irregular migrations. However, the protagonists of rigid fences against migrants and refugees, headed by the Visegrad Group that consists of Czech Republic, Poland, Slovak Republic and Hungary supported by Italy, Greece and Austria, support their position using their own logic according to which “in order to close the door, the door has to exist in the

first place". At the end of the day, the question remains where is Europe headed for confronted with the challenge of migrations, and if it will continue pursuing ever more rigid policies. Currently, everything points to that direction.

The arguments of ideologists and protagonists of erecting and multiplying walls in the fight against irregular migrations are declaratively based on the fear of insecurity and loss of jobs by indigenous population, but they are essentially based on the power of populist messages (mostly effective in election campaigns) and gaining financial benefit through non-transparent dealings with companies close to political establishment.

On the other hand, the arguments of those who oppose the walls underline that they are expensive, strengthening divisions and antagonisms. Not only do they not prevent people from crossing the borders, but they encourage the creation of new, longer, more expensive and dangerous routes producing two obvious winners - the companies that build them and smugglers, who remained as only "providers" of border crossing.

It is evident that the problem of irregular migration in Europe will not be systematically solved for a long time. The risk remains that the walls and fences will only "additionally ignite passion" and continue postponing necessary debates on long-term actions with ever greater number of asylum seekers in Europe from all over the world affected by war, natural disasters and global warming. That issue that the European Union should deal with in its new "Pact on Migration and Asylum", is solved much more slowly, mainly because of the resistance of those who feel safer living "behind the wall".

Key words: migrations, security, borders, walls, conflicts.

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